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Note
DOWNLOADING MINIMUM CONTACTS:
THE PROPRIETY OF EXERCISING PERSONAL
JURISDICTION BASED ON SMARTPHONE APPS
JOANNA SIBILLA TAATJES
As technology has changed the way in which individuals interact with each other,
courts have sought to address how non-physical contacts with a forum state should factor
into the analysis of whether to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.
Courts have yet to decide whether a defendant should be subject to personal jurisdiction in
a state where the defendant’s only contacts with the forum took place through smartphone
apps. The growing prevalence of smartphones and apps, however, has brought with it the
need for courts to consider exactly that issue. Apps are in many ways a combination of the
Internet and computer software, and courts have addressed the personal jurisdiction
implications of both. So should apps be treated the same as the Internet and websites for
the minimum contacts inquiry? Should they be treated more like computer software?
This Note applies four personal jurisdiction frameworks to a hypothetical case where
the defendant’s only contact with the forum state arises from the download of a smartphone
app that he created. Under three of the frameworks, I conclude that a court would likely
find that the app created sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state such that
exercising personal jurisdiction would be constitutional.
However, establishing minimum contacts does not end the analysis. Courts must also
determine whether exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant would be fair. I
argue that the unique circumstances surrounding apps and their creation are such that
exercising personal jurisdiction may not always be fair even when minimum contacts have
been established.
Courts were originally hostile to finding minimum contacts solely on the basis of a
defendant’s Internet contacts with the forum state. However, as the importance and
prevalence of the Internet grew, so did courts’ acceptance of Internet contacts as a basis for
exercising personal jurisdiction. Smartphone apps are the new frontier for wireless
interaction. This Note concludes that the traditional personal jurisdiction analysis remains
the best way to assess whether a defendant’s app contacts with a forum state are sufficient
to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
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DOWNLOADING MINIMUM CONTACTS:
THE PROPRIETY OF EXERCISING PERSONAL
JURISDICTION BASED ON SMARTPHONE APPS
JOANNA SIBILLA TAATJES
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a company that is in the business of gathering data on weather
conditions from around the world. The company employs meteorologists
to create forecasts of what the weather will be for the next week in any
given location based on the collected data. This company expends
considerable resources to collect the data, analyze it, and create the
forecasts. Once the forecasts are made, media outlets and websites, such
as the New York Times and Google, pay a licensing fee to use and publish
the forecasts.
The company discovers that a smartphone application (“app”) that
provides weather forecasts for locations around the world has been created,
and the company believes that the forecasts contained in the app are its
own. The app is available as a free download, but the creator profits from
the app by selling advertising space on the bottom of the screen when the
app is displayed. When a user opens the app, the geolocation technology
built into the smartphone immediately displays the weather for the phone’s
current location. Users may also use the search function to learn the
weather for other places. Further investigation reveals that the app is based
on the company’s information and that the maker of the app is not paying
the licensing fee.
The company brings suit in Connecticut, where it is incorporated and
has its principal place of business. The app creator is a single individual
who resides in California, and he is not in the business of creating apps for
a living. He files a motion to dismiss, claiming lack of personal
jurisdiction.1 The creator’s only contact with Connecticut is the fact that
smartphones in Connecticut can download and have downloaded the app.
Is personal jurisdiction proper?2
This situation presents the novel question of whether personal


Bowdoin College, B.A. 2010; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2013.
Personal jurisdiction is a doctrine governing “[a] court’s power to bring a person into its
adjudicative process.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 930 (9th ed. 2009).
2
These entities and litigation are fictional. The scenario, however, is loosely based on the facts
presented in West World Media, LLC v. Ikamobile Ltd., 809 F. Supp. 2d 26, 27–29 (D. Conn. 2011).
1
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jurisdiction can and should be premised on a defendant’s “app” contacts
with a forum state.3 The primary question is whether the fact that the app
can be downloaded and accessed in the forum state creates sufficient
minimum contacts.4 If it does, the analysis next considers whether
exercising personal jurisdiction over the app-creating defendant would
violate “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”5
Part II of this Note begins by briefly examining the technology behind
how smartphones, apps, and the Internet operate. Because Internet
personal jurisdiction doctrine is informed in part by an understanding of
how the Internet works, comparing how the Internet functions to how
smartphones and apps function will be instructive when examining where
apps fit into the current personal jurisdiction framework.
Part III then examines existing personal jurisdiction doctrines into
which apps may fit. Based on the technology that is discussed in Part II,
this Note argues that smartphone apps are essentially a combination of a
computer program and the Internet, and therefore Part III examines how
personal jurisdiction is applied to those scenarios.
Part IV discusses how the existing personal jurisdiction doctrines
would be applied to apps and whether one of the current doctrines
sufficiently addresses this novel application. Part IV.A addresses the
question of minimum contacts, and Part IV.B addresses whether exercising
personal jurisdiction would satisfy the fairness requirements. While the
determination that the defendant has established minimum contacts is
dispositive in most cases,6 this Note will argue that apps and how they are
created present compelling issues regarding whether exercising personal
jurisdiction would violate fair play and substantial justice.
II. BACKGROUND ON SMARTPHONES, APPS, AND THE INTERNET
The Internet is a “global network of interconnected computers which
allows individuals to instantaneously communicate with other[s].”7 The

3

This Note addresses only the question of specific personal jurisdiction.
See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (requiring that an out-of-state
defendant have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state before a court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over the defendant).
5
Id.
6
See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(“This is one of those rare cases in which ‘minimum requirements inherent in the concept of fair play
and substantial justice . . . defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even [though] the defendant has
purposefully engaged in forum activities.’” (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
477–78 (1985) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
7
Quinn K. Nemeyer, Comment, Don’t Hate the Player, Hate the Game: Applying the Traditional
Concepts of General Jurisdiction to Internet Contacts, 52 LOY. L. REV. 147, 165 (2006).
4
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8

Internet can be accessed anywhere in the world, and it is indifferent to the
physical location of the machines that are accessing it. As a result, users
frequently do not know the physical location of the other users and entities
with whom they are interacting.9 Unlike with print media, content that is
posted online is “continuous and permanent.”10
Smartphones were introduced to the American market in the mid-tolate 2000s. These new devices essentially merged existing telephone and
computer technologies into a single device11 which was not only capable of
making phone calls, but also of accessing the Internet and receiving and
sending email. Demand for these new phones was high, and currently 35%
of American adults own a smartphone.12
Those who own smartphones take advantage of the device’s nontraditional phone capabilities. Eighty-seven percent of smartphone owners
report using their phone to access the Internet or their email, including
68% who use their smartphone to access the Internet on a typical day.13 Of
those who use their smartphone to access the Internet or their email, 28%
use their smartphone for most of their online activity.14
As the market for smartphones grew, so did the market for apps.15 An
“app,” which is the popular term for a software application, is a program
that “facilitates performance of a task or retrieval of information.”16 Apps
were originally designed to make cell phones more like computers by
allowing users to complete tasks such as email.17 Today, however, there is
an app for almost any conceivable task. There are apps that allow users to
do tasks as varied as checking the stock market, uploading photos to social
networking websites, and monitoring sports and fitness goals.18 Apple’s
App Store currently offers over 500,000 apps for download19 and the
8
Allison MacDonald, Comment, YouTubing Down the Stream of Commerce: Eliminating the
Express Aiming Requirement for Personal Jurisdiction in User-Generated Internet Content Cases, 19
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 519, 532 (2009).
9
James P. Donahue, Personal Jurisdiction, in INTERNET LAW AND PRACTICE 9-1, 9-13 (2011).
10
MacDonald, supra note 8, at 532–33.
11
Greg Snodgrass, Note, Business Solutions to the Alien Ownership Restriction, 61 FED. COMM.
L.J. 457, 459 (2008).
12
AARON SMITH, PEW RES. CTR., 35% OF AMERICAN ADULTS OWN A SMARTPHONE 2 (2011),
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Smartphones.aspx.
13
Id. at 3.
14
Id. at 14.
15
The Apple “App Store” currently makes available over 500,000 apps for download by iPhone
users. iPhone, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/iphone/from-the-app-store/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2011).
16
David Bell & Hope Hughes, One Bad App Spoils the Bunch: Brand Protection in the App Era,
74 TEX. B.J. 218, 219 (2011).
17
What is a Cell Phone App?, WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-cell-phoneapp.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2011).
18
See iPhone, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/iphone/from-the-app-store/ (last visited Nov. 2,
2011) (listing the different kinds of apps available for download from the Apple “App Store”).
19
Id.
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Android Market offers more than 200,000 apps.
Apps are not created solely by smartphone and software companies.
There are a number of do-it-yourself app-development websites that guide
individuals through the steps of creating an app.21 Some websites even use
a simple “point-and-click” technology so that individuals need not know
how to write code.22 Because some of the websites provide the service for
free23 and are relatively easy to use, almost anyone with Internet access can
create an app.
Some apps come pre-installed on a smartphone,24 while others can be
downloaded by accessing an app store hosted by the maker of the
smartphone.25
These stores are only accessible when using the
smartphone.26 When a user selects the app that he wants to download,
information is sent to a host computer requesting the information, and the
host computer then sends the app files to the smartphone.27 Once an app
has been downloaded and installed, using it is similar to using a
computer.28 Some apps, known as “web apps,” require access to the
Internet to function after they have been downloaded;29 others do not
require Internet access after the original download.
Apps and the Internet are similar in many ways. The most significant
difference is that the app is downloaded directly to the phone, and
therefore the app occupies a “physical” presence on the smartphone similar
to software on a computer. For the purposes of assessing minimum
contacts, it is useful to think of apps as a combination between the Internet
and computer software. However, because apps are downloaded from the
Internet and frequently access the Internet after they have been
downloaded, the comparison to the Internet and websites is stronger than
the comparison to computer software, which exists solely on an
individual’s computer.

20
Kim Komando, Make Your Own Smartphone Apps, USA TODAY, Sept. 8, 2011,
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/kimkomando/story/2011-09-09/Make-your-own-smartphoneassp/50322124/1.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
See id. (discussing some of the websites that provide app-building services and their cost).
24
iPhone, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/iphone/from-the-app-store/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2011).
25
Elijah Chau, How Do Apps Work on a Cell Phone?, EHOW.COM (Apr. 16, 2012),
http://www.ehow.com/facts_7789400_do-apps-work-cell-phone.html.
26
Id.
27
See Natalya Shmulevich, Note, A Minimum Contacts and Fairness Examination of Personal
Jurisdiction over Providers of Free Downloads on the Internet, 13 MEDIA L. & POL’Y 55, 68–69
(2004) (explaining how Internet downloads work).
28
Id.
29
Web Apps, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/webapps/whatarewebapps.html (last visited Nov. 2,
2011).
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III. CURRENT PERSONAL JURISDICTION DOCTRINE
It is useful to compare smartphone apps to the Internet and to computer
software because apps essentially combine these two forms of technology.
Because smartphone apps are similar to the Internet and computer
programs, perhaps the personal jurisdiction doctrines that would be
applicable in each of those situations can be applied to apps. This Part first
discusses the current state of personal jurisdiction doctrine, as traditional
principles of personal jurisdiction may be best suited to evaluate whether
apps create sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state. The Part
then examines the two most prominent doctrines for determining whether
personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on the defendant’s Internet
contacts with the forum state is proper. Finally, after discussing Internet
personal jurisdiction doctrine, this Part examines stream-of-commerce
jurisdiction, which may be applied to the analogy of an app as computer
software and has also been used in examining contacts on the “electronic
stream-of-commerce.”
A. Traditional Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine
The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution permits a court to
exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant in any state with which the
defendant has “certain minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.”30 The requirement that a defendant have minimum contacts with
the forum state performs two functions.31 First, “[i]t protects the defendant
against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum,” 32 an
interest typically described in terms of “reasonableness or fairness.”33
Second, “it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach
out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal
sovereigns in a federal system”;34 this interest is typically referred to in
terms of “federalism” or “sovereignty.”35
In determining whether a defendant has established minimum contacts,
courts will look at the quality of the relationship between the defendant and
the forum state. An important inquiry is whether the defendant has
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1980).
32
Id. at 292.
33
The Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Leading Cases, Constitutional Law, Personal Jurisdiction
Stream-of-Commerce Doctrine: J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 125 HARV. L. REV. 172, 311
(2011) [hereinafter Stream-of-Commerce].
34
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
35
Stream-of-Commerce, supra note 33, at 311.
30
31
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“purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.”36 Courts will also examine whether it was foreseeable that the
defendant could be haled into court in the forum state based on his contacts
with the forum.37
If the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state,
the court will next determine whether exercising jurisdiction over the outof-state defendant would comport with traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. A finding of minimum contacts raises the presumption
that exercising jurisdiction would be fair,38 but that presumption may be
defeated by the particular facts of the case. Courts will consider: (1) the
burden on the defendant of having to litigate in a foreign state; (2) the
forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest
in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial
system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies;
and (5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies.39 This fairness inquiry is meant to be applied
flexibly to account for the facts presented and the circumstances of the
parties in each case.40
If the defendant has established minimum contacts and the court is
satisfied that it would not be unfair to subject the defendant to suit in the
forum state, then the exercise of personal jurisdiction is constitutional.
B. Internet Jurisdiction
When the Internet first came into existence, courts were generally
reluctant to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant based solely on
the defendant’s Internet contacts with the forum state.41 Fitting the Internet
36

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (“[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due
process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather,
it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”).
38
Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to Fair Play and Substantial Justice?, 63 S.C. L. REV. 745, 746
(2012) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)).
39
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
40
Leslie W. Abramson, Clarifying “Fair Play and Substantial Justice”: How the Courts Apply
the Supreme Court Standard for Personal Jurisdiction, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441, 446 (1991).
41
Shmulevich, supra note 27, at 60 (“[C]ourts were reluctant to find jurisdiction without a nonInternet contact.”). In one early case, however, the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut exercised personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant based solely on the
defendant’s website. See Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn.
1996). The defendant operated a website advertising its goods and services, and the website contained
a phone number at which customers could contact the defendant. Id. at 163. Treating the website as an
advertisement which was continuously available on the Internet, the court held that the defendant had
purposely availed itself of doing business in Connecticut such that personal jurisdiction over the
defendant was proper. Id. at 165.
37
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into traditional notions of personal jurisdiction posed significant doctrinal
issues. Discussing some of these issues, the court in Digital Equipment
Corp. v. AltaVista Technology, Inc.42 stated:
The Internet has no territorial boundaries. . . . [A]s far as the
Internet is concerned, not only is there perhaps “no there
there,” the “there” is everywhere where there is Internet
access. When business is transacted over a computer Website accessed by a computer in Massachusetts, it takes place
as much in Massachusetts, literally or figuratively, as it does
anywhere.43
However, as the Internet became a more integral and pervasive technology,
courts began to exercise personal jurisdiction in cases where a defendant’s
only contacts with a forum state were Internet based.44
When courts began exercising personal jurisdiction based on a
defendant’s Internet contacts, they generally relied on traditional personal
jurisdiction principles.45 Many of the cases that upheld the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a defendant based solely on the defendant’s
Internet contacts were predicated on the idea that the defendant was either
purposefully availing himself of the privilege of doing business in the
forum state or that the defendant had purposefully directed his activities at
the state.46 In essence, the rationale was that a defendant could have
structured his or her online conduct so that it was not available in a
particular forum or was only available in some forums. 47 However, this
rationale ignored the realities of the Internet—the Internet is structured
such that it is not possible to avoid contact with a specific forum apart from
completely staying off the Internet and thereby avoiding all forums.48
Therefore, as courts searched to determine whether minimum contacts
existed on a case-by-case basis, an understanding of how the Internet
functioned became more important to the analysis.49 Courts developed
tests for assessing personal jurisdiction that were specific to the Internet
context.50 This Part discusses the two most prominent Internet jurisdiction

42

960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997).
Id. at 462.
44
See JONATHAN D. HART, INTERNET LAW: A FIELD GUIDE 638 (6th ed. 2008) (“In some cases,
the existence of a website that is accessible by residents of a given state may be the only ‘contacts’ the
defendant has within that state.”).
45
Id.
46
Donahue, supra note 9, at 9-14.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 9-15.
49
Nemeyer, supra note 7, at 168–69 (discussing how courts modified their approach to personal
jurisdiction as they came to better understand the Internet).
50
HART, supra note 44, at 638.
43
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tests: the Zippo “sliding scale” test and the effects test.

51

1. Zippo “Sliding Scale” Test
In 1997, the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
developed a test to determine whether the Internet contacts of a defendant
were sufficient to establish minimum contacts.52 In Zippo Manufacturing
Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., the court articulated a “sliding scale” test
wherein “the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally
exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial
activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.”53
The case involved a dispute between two companies over an Internet
domain name, and the plaintiff sought to sue the defendant, a California
company, in Pennsylvania.54 The defendant did not have any offices,
employees, or agents in Pennsylvania.55 Instead, the defendant’s contacts
with Pennsylvania occurred almost exclusively through its website, which
could be accessed from within Pennsylvania.56 The website contained
information about the company, advertisements, and an application for
customers to receive access to an Internet news service that the defendant
produced.57 A customer who wanted to subscribe to the news service did
so by filling out an online application and paying a fee either over the
Internet or the phone.58 Approximately two percent of the defendant’s
subscribers were Pennsylvania residents, and the defendant had contracted
with seven Internet service providers in Pennsylvania to permit their
customers to access the defendant’s news service.59 The defendant filed a
motion to dismiss, claiming that it did not have sufficient minimum
contacts with Pennsylvania for the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction
to be constitutional.60
The court identified three kinds of websites for the purpose of
determining whether minimum contacts exist: (1) passive websites;
(2) interactive websites; and (3) websites that fall somewhere between
passive and active.61 Passive websites describe websites where the
51
Another test used by courts is known as the “totality of contacts” analysis wherein the court
considers the defendant’s Internet contacts along with the defendant’s more traditional contacts, such as
physicality. Id. at 639. The “totality of contacts” test is not discussed in this Note because the analysis
considers more than just the Internet contacts of the defendant.
52
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
53
Id.
54
Id. at 1120.
55
Id. at 1121.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 1124.
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defendant has “simply posted information on an Internet [website] which is
accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions.”62 In cases such as this, the
court held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is improper.63 On the
other end of the spectrum are interactive websites where the defendant
“clearly does business over the Internet.”64 Because doing business
involves “enter[ing] into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction
that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over
the Internet,” exercising personal jurisdiction is proper.65 In the middle
ground are interactive websites where the user can exchange information
with a host computer. To determine whether the defendant has sufficient
minimum contacts in these cases, a court will “examin[e] the level of
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that
occurs on the [website].”66 When a website falls into this middle ground, it
must be shown that the defendant has actually interacted with residents of
the forum state; simply having the potential to do so through the website is
insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.67
The court concluded that the defendant’s website fell into the
interactive category because the defendant entered into contracts with
residents and companies of Pennsylvania from which it profited.68 Based
on those contacts with Pennsylvania, the court held that the defendant had
purposefully availed itself of doing business in Pennsylvania, and
therefore, jurisdiction was proper.69
Since the sliding scale test was articulated in Zippo, nearly every
Circuit has adopted the test in one form or another.70 A central part of
62

Id.
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. Most courts have essentially combined the analysis of interactivity and commerciality by
holding that in order for a website to be interactive, the defendant must profit, or have the potential to
profit, commercially from the website. Shmulevich, supra note 27, at 63.
67
See, e.g., People Solutions, Inc. v. People Solutions, Inc., No. 3:99-CV-2339-L, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10444, at *11 (N.D. Tex. July 26, 2000) (“Personal jurisdiction should not be premised on the
mere possibility, with nothing more, that Defendant may be able to do business with Texans over its
web site; rather, Plaintiff must show that Defendant has ‘purposefully availed itself’ of the benefits of
the forum state and its laws.”).
68
Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1125.
69
Id. at 1126–27.
70
Kevin F. King, Personal Jurisdiction, Internet Commerce, and Privacy: The Pervasive Legal
Consequences of Modern Geolocation Technologies, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 61, 79 (2011). Two
Circuits have explicitly rejected the Zippo framework. See Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d
239, 252 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that while the Zippo framework may help frame the judicial inquiry in
some cases, it does not amount to a separate framework for analyzing Internet jurisdiction cases;
instead, “traditional statutory and constitutional principles remain the touchstone of the inquiry”
(quoting Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, No. 03 Civ. 6585, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7830, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2004))); Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 510–11 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (holding that traditional notions of personal jurisdiction can and should be adapted to address a
63
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Zippo’s continued prominence in assessing Internet jurisdiction cases is
due to the “court’s translation of . . . amorphous due process principles to
the Internet setting.”71 However, the Zippo test has faced increasing
criticism in recent years.72 One criticism is that at the time that Zippo was
decided, many websites were passive; today however, there remain few
truly passive websites.73 As the scope and technological abilities of the
Internet have increased, the Zippo test has failed to evolve to address new
factors which may be useful in determining whether a defendant has
established minimum contacts with the forum state.74
2. Calder v. Jones Effects Test
Many courts have also adopted the “effects test”under which
personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant is proper if the
defendant directed his or her activity at a particular forumto address
Internet personal jurisdiction cases.75 The effects test was first articulated
in Calder v. Jones,76 wherein the plaintiff Shirley Jones brought suit in
California claiming that she had been libeled by an article written and
edited by the defendants in Florida.77 The article was published in a
weekly newspaper with a circulation of approximately 600,000 in
California, the state in which Jones lived and worked.78 Aside from the
circulation of the newspaper, the defendant did not have any substantial, or
indeed minimum, contacts with the state.79 However, the Supreme Court
held that personal jurisdiction over the defendants in California was proper
because “California [is] the focal point both of the story and of the harm
suffered.”80 The Court went on to hold that personal jurisdiction is proper
where a defendant purposefully aims its actions at the forum state,
knowing that the injury would be felt most strongly there, because the

defendant’s Internet contacts). Additionally, the Eleventh and Federal Circuits have not definitively
adopted or rejected the Zippo test. See Roblor Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. GPS Indus., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d
1130, 1140–41 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (noting that the Federal Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit had not
expressly adopted or rejected the Zippo test).
71
King, supra note 70, at 81.
72
See Donahue, supra note 9, at 9-22–9-24 (citing cases which have rejected or criticized the
Zippo framework).
73
Id. at 9-22.
74
See King, supra note 70, at 86 (arguing that the Zippo test has failed to adapt to the fact that
many websites now employ geolocation technologies, a potentially important factor to be considered in
the jurisdictional analysis).
75
Shmulevich, supra note 27, at 65.
76
465 U.S. 783 (1984).
77
Id. at 784.
78
Id. at 785.
79
Id. at 785–86.
80
Id. at 789.
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defendant can “reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”
A few courts have exercised personal jurisdiction under the effects test
even in the absence of evidence that the activity was specifically targeted
on the theory that personal jurisdiction is proper whenever harm occurs in
the forum state.82 Most courts, however, hold that “the mere allegation that
the plaintiff feels the effect of the defendant’s tortious conduct in the forum
because the plaintiff is located there is insufficient to satisfy Calder.”83
It should be noted that the Zippo test and the effects test are not
mutually exclusive because the applicability of the effects test has
generally been limited to intellectual property and intentional tort claims. 84
81

C. Stream of Commerce
Stream of commerce doctrine was developed to apply to situations in
which a defendant distributes products through a third party rather than by
direct sales to customers, and the product is swept into the forum state
through the “stream of commerce.”85 The Supreme Court’s leading stream
of commerce case is Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court.86 In
Asahi, the Court was asked to determine whether
the mere awareness on the part of a foreign defendant that the
components it manufactured, sold, and delivered outside the
United States would reach the forum State in the stream of
commerce constitutes “minimum contacts” between the
defendant and the forum State such that the exercise of
jurisdiction “does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.’”87
Divided into four-Justice pluralities, the Court was unable to decide
whether the defendant had established minimum contacts.88 Thus, the
Justices articulated three different standards for establishing minimum
contacts through the stream of commerce.
Justice O’Connor’s opinion stated that “[t]he placement of a product
into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant
81

Id. at 789–90 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
HART, supra note 44, at 677 (citing Peregrine Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Green, No. 01 C 2948, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14317, at *9–11 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2001)); see, e.g., Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy, 132
F.3d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1997) (exercising personal jurisdiction where an out-of-state defendant’s sole
contact with the forum state was that he committed a tort and the harm was felt in the forum state).
83
IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 263 (3d Cir. 1998).
84
Shmulevich, supra note 27, at 65.
85
Erik T. Moe, Comment, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court: The Stream of Commerce
Doctrine, Barely Alive but Still Kicking, 76 GEO. L.J. 203, 203 (1987).
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480 U.S. 102 (1987).
87
Id. at 105.
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Id.
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purposefully directed toward the forum State.” This test is often referred
to as “stream of commerce plus.” A court may find purposeful direction
where the defendant takes actions such as “designing the product for the
market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing
channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or
marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the
sales agent in the forum State.”90 However, mere awareness that the
product will enter a forum state is not enough.91
Justice Brennan, in contrast, articulated a pure stream of commerce
view where a showing of additional conduct purposefully directed at the
forum state is unnecessary to establish personal jurisdiction.92 Justice
Brennan stated, “[a]s long as a participant [in placing a product into the
stream of commerce] is aware that the final product is being marketed in
the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a
surprise.”93
Finally, Justice Stevens wrote a brief concurrence in which he argued
that whether a defendant’s conduct constitutes purposeful availment such
that sufficient minimum contacts are established is affected “by the
volume, the value, and the hazardous character of the components” placed
into the stream of commerce.94 Referencing the facts of the case, Justice
Stevens concluded that “a regular course of dealing that results in
deliveries of over 100,000 units annually over a period of several years
would constitute ‘purposeful availment’ even though the item delivered to
the forum State was a standard product marketed throughout the world.”95
When stream of commerce doctrine is applied to personal jurisdiction
disputes based on the “electronic stream of commerce,” Justice
O’Connor’s test has prevailed.96 In a recent Supreme Court decision
addressing stream of commerce doctrine, Justice Breyer rhetorically
questioned the application of stream of commerce plus analysis to cases
where the defendant “targets the world by selling products from its Web
site.”97 He further questioned how it would apply to situations where
instead of shipping products directly to consumers, the defendant
“consigns the products through an intermediary (say, Amazon.com) who
89
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Id. at 112.
Id.
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See id. (“[A] defendant’s awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product
into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act
purposefully directed toward the forum State.”).
92
Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Id.
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Id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Id.
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Howard B. Stravitz, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Something More is Required on the
Electronic Stream of Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 925, 932 (1998).
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J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2793 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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then receives and fulfills the orders.”
Lower courts have exercised
personal jurisdiction over defendants in both of Justice Breyer’s scenarios,
finding that the defendants purposefully availed themselves of the laws of
the forum state by sending their products there.99 In the first scenario,
where the defendant directly sells and ships the goods, courts have
generally relied on the Zippo test to find personal jurisdiction.100 In the
second scenario, courts have exercised personal jurisdiction over
defendants in situations where the defendant conducts its business through
an entity such as eBay or Amazon and offers shipping of its products
throughout the United States and the world,101 finding that the defendants
had purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of doing business in
the forum state.102
98

IV. APPS AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Because no court has ruled on the issue of personal jurisdiction and
smartphone apps, this Part applies the different doctrines discussed in Part
III to the fact pattern at the beginning of this Note to determine whether a
court would find that the app created sufficient minimum contacts with the
forum state such that personal jurisdiction is proper. Part IV.A. discusses
the minimum contacts analysis. However, finding sufficient minimum
contacts does not end the inquiry because a court must then determine
whether exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant would comply
with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.103 Therefore,
this second step of the personal jurisdiction inquiry is discussed in Part
IV.B.
A. Minimum Contacts
1. Traditional Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine
Under the traditional doctrine, courts examine three elements to
determine whether the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the
forum state to be subjected to jurisdiction there: (1) the quality of the
relationship between the defendant and the forum state;104 (2) whether the
defendant has purposefully availed itself of the laws of the jurisdiction; 105
98

Id.
Stream-of-Commerce, supra note 33, at 318–19.
100
Id.
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Id. at 319.
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See Dedvukaj v. Maloney, 447 F. Supp. 2d 813, 822 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (exercising personal
jurisdiction over a defendant who conducted business through eBay).
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Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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Id. at 319.
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Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
99

372

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:357

and (3) whether being haled into court in the forum jurisdiction was
foreseeable.106
In the fact pattern previously presented, the quality of the relationship
between the defendant and Connecticut is relatively low. The defendant’s
contacts with Connecticut are not of the type to which courts generally
look to find minimum contacts. The defendant does not live in
Connecticut107 and has never been to Connecticut. The defendant has not
physically mailed or sent anything to Connecticut.108 The defendant’s only
contact with Connecticut is the app, and the app was transmitted over the
Internet by a third party. By traditional standards, the quality of this
contact is weak.
On the other hand, a strong argument can be made that the defendant
purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activity in
Connecticut. The defendant created the app with the intention that it
would be downloaded worldwide. The more times the app is downloaded,
the more income the defendant will receive (either directly from the sale of
the app or from advertising revenues), and therefore the defendant has
incentive to direct the app to the entire world.
It is true, however, that the defendant did not specifically reach out and
avail himself of the laws of Connecticut.109 Rather than reaching out to
Connecticut, the defendant essentially reached out to every forum.
However, the purposeful availment remains. This fact may be illustrated
by the facts presented in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.110 The
defendant, Hustler Magazine, was an Ohio-based corporation in the
business of publishing and circulating a magazine nationwide, including in
New Hampshire.111 The plaintiff brought suit for libel in New Hampshire,
and the Court held that personal jurisdiction was proper.112 Even though
the defendant had not specifically reached out to New Hampshire more
than any other jurisdiction, because the magazines were circulated in New
Hampshire, the defendant had availed itself of the opportunity to engage in
in-state activities.113
The same reasoning can be applied to the contacts in question here.
The defendant profits from making the app available to consumers in
106

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 724 (1878) (“Where a party is within a territory, he may
justly be subjected to its process, and bound personally by the judgment pronounced on such process
against him.”).
108
See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (holding that personal jurisdiction
was proper where the defendant mailed various documents to the plaintiff in California).
109
See id. (finding that the defendant reached out to California when it specifically mailed
documents to an individual living there).
110
465 U.S. 770 (1984).
111
Id. at 772.
112
Id. at 773.
113
Id. at 774.
107

2012]

DOWNLOADING MINIMUM CONTACTS

373

Connecticut and every state. The mere fact that the defendant has
purposefully availed himself of doing business everywhere does not
minimize the fact that he purposefully availed himself of doing business in
Connecticut.114 Thus, a court would likely conclude that the defendant
purposefully availed himself of the laws of Connecticut.
It is also likely that a court would determine that it was foreseeable that
the defendant could be haled into court in the forum state. Smartphone
apps are made available to consumers through online “stores” that can be
accessed from a user’s smartphone.115 Because these stores are available
anywhere that smartphones can access the Internet, apps are likewise
available for download anywhere a user may access the Internet. As a
result, it was foreseeable to the defendant that he could be haled into court
anywhere that smartphones can access the Internet, which is virtually
everywhere.
So would a court hold that there are sufficient minimum contacts to
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant? Probably. In coming to
this conclusion, it is helpful to compare the factual scenario at hand to
another case that dealt with similar relevant facts.
In Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC,116 the Second Circuit
held that sufficient minimum contacts existed between the defendant and
New York, the forum state, to exercise personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.117 Queen Bee, an Alabama corporation, operated a website
which sold counterfeit designer bags to consumers throughout the United
States and select locations worldwide.118 The defendant’s only contacts
with New York were its website and the fact that at least one bag had been
sold to a customer in New York.119 By selling at least one bag to a
customer in New York, the court stated that the defendant had
“purposefully avail[ed] [him]self of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.”120 Furthermore, because the bag was actually purchased and
shipped to a customer in New York, as opposed to a New York resident
114
See Kernan v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 175 F.3d 236, 243 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that personal
jurisdiction was proper where a sales agreement indicating that a product would be sold worldwide was
evidence of an attempt to serve the market of the forum state).
115
See supra Part II.
116
616 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2010).
117
Id. at 171. I purposefully selected a case from the Second Circuit because the Second Circuit
has not adopted the Zippo test. See Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 252 (2d Cir. 2007).
Because this section of the Note is devoted to assessing minimum contacts under traditional personal
jurisdiction doctrine, and the Zippo framework is discussed in Part IV.A.2, using a case that assessed
Internet contacts without relying on Zippo is necessary to distinguish the two doctrinal approaches.
118
Chloe, 616 F.3d at 162.
119
Id. at 171.
120
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475
(1985)).
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merely viewing the defendant’s website, “there can be no doubt that [the
defendant’s] conduct was ‘purposefully directed toward the forum
State.’”121 Even though the defendant’s contacts with the forum state were
fairly limited, the court held that sufficient minimum contacts existed
because the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privileges of
conducting activities in New York.
The facts in the present case are similar. While the defendant’s
contacts with the forum state are limited to creating an app that can be, and
was, downloaded in the forum state, the defendant has purposefully availed
itself of the privilege to conduct activity within the forum state. Therefore,
a court would likely determine that sufficient minimum contacts exist.
2. Zippo “Sliding Scale” Test
The Zippo test evaluates a defendant’s Internet contacts by examining
the nature and the quality of the commercial activity that a defendant
conducts over the Internet.122 In attempting to evaluate that activity, the
Zippo framework instructs courts to place a defendant’s website into one
of three categories: (1) passive; (2) interactive; or (3) between passive and
interactive.123
In the present case, the defendant’s app is not a website, per se.
However, for the purposes of the minimum contacts inquiry, the two can
and should be treated the same.124 Under the Zippo framework, the app
likely falls in the middle ground between passive and interactive. To begin
with, the app is downloaded from the Internet. Because the download
involves an interaction between the smartphone and the host computer, the
app is not passive.125 Furthermore, the app itself is not passive. The app
does more than simply provide uniform information to the user; it provides
a search function so that users can look up the weather for a particular
location. This search function is another exchange of information between
the user and the host computer; therefore, the app is not passive.
Additionally, the app is at least minimally commercial because the
defendant profits from making the app available. Although the app may be
downloaded for free, the defendant provides advertising space on the apps.
The more times that the app is downloaded, the more the defendant is able
to charge for the advertising space. Therefore, the defendant profits from
making the app widely available.
At the same time, however, the defendant’s app does not fall into the
interactive category. To determine if the website is interactive, courts look
121

Id. (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987)).
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
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Id.
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See supra Part II.
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to whether the defendant conducts business and enters into contracts over
the Internet, and whether the defendant engages in a knowing and repeated
transmission of files over the Internet.126 Apart from providing advertising
space on the apps, the defendant does not conduct business over the
Internet because the app may be downloaded for free.127 The defendant
does enter into agreements over the Internet because when a user
downloads the defendant’s app, or any other app, he must agree to the
terms and conditions of the provided click-wrap agreement.128 However,
this agreement is not a traditional contract for goods or services as
envisioned by the Zippo court because there is no monetary exchange.
Finally, the defendant does not engage in the knowing and repeated
transmission of files over the Internet. While the defendant’s host
computer transmits files and information over the Internet, it is not clear
that the transmission is “knowingly” conducted by the defendant. The
download and search functions are automated, so the defendant does not
actively engage in contact with users once the app has been created.
As a result, the app likely falls somewhere in the middle ground
between passive and interactive. When an app falls in this category, courts
assess whether there are sufficient minimum contacts by looking to the
level of interactivity, the commercial nature of the website, and the extent
of actual interaction between the defendant’s website and residents of the
forum state.129
In the present case, the level of interactivity is moderate. The user
interacts with the host computer when he downloads the app and
subsequently whenever he conducts a search using the app. Additionally,
an argument has been made that the geolocation aspect of an app should
militate in favor of finding minimum contacts.130 Customizing the app to
account for the location in which it is being used constitutes a form of
interactivity.131 However, the interactivity is not as high as the interactivity
of a website that allows a user to make purchases online, for instance. The
app simply provides the information that is queried. A website that allows
purchases, on the other hand, creates a sales agreement, charges the
individual’s form of payment, sends out confirmation emails, and puts the
126

Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
See Shmulevich, supra note 27, at 76. If users were required to pay for the app, that would
constitute doing business over the Internet.
128
A “click-wrap agreement” is a contract that is created when “one party sets up a proposed
electronic form agreement to which another party may assent by clicking an icon or a button or by
typing in a set of specified words.” Christina L. Kunz et al., Click-Through Agreements: Strategies for
Avoiding Disputes on Validity of Assent, 57 BUS. LAW. 401, 401 (2001).
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Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
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See King, supra note 70, at 90 (arguing that when websites use geolocation technology to
customize their content, that technology increases the interactivity of the website under the Zippo
analysis).
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order into production.
The commercial nature of the app is also moderate. The defendant
does not directly profit by selling a good to the user. Instead, the
commercial nature is indirect because the defendant solicits advertisers
who pay the defendant for allowing them to, at least theoretically, profit
from the app’s users. However, the link between soliciting advertisements
and finding that the app is of a commercial nature should not be
understated. The case law supports the assertion that when a defendant
website owner profits by selling ad space on his website, that commercial
transaction makes it more likely that personal jurisdiction is proper. In
Gather, Inc. v. Gatheroo, LLC,132 the court assessed how advertisements
on the defendant’s website affected the jurisdictional analysis.133 The
defendant solicited advertisers to place ads on its website, and those
advertisements were made available to users in the forum state.134 Because
the defendant essentially solicited revenue from users who viewed its
website by exposing them to the advertisements, the court held that
personal jurisdiction was proper.135 Likewise, in LFG, LLC v. Zapata
Corp.,136 the court held that minimum contacts existed under the Zippo
framework when the defendant’s website contained advertisements.137 The
defendant encouraged users to join the website’s mailing list in order to
increase the number of subscribers because by increasing that number, the
defendant’s ability to earn revenue from advertisements on its website
increased.138
The last factor to which courts look—the extent of the interaction
between the website and residents of the forum state—weighs in favor of
exercising personal jurisdiction. Because the app has been downloaded
and continues to be available for download in Connecticut, there is
considerable interaction between the app and residents of Connecticut.
Weighing the interactivity of the app and the commercial nature, a
court would likely conclude that the app creates sufficient minimum
contacts with the forum state. While the advertisements alone are
insufficient to create minimum contacts139 and the interactivity of the app
is insufficient to create minimum contacts without also having the
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443 F. Supp. 2d 108 (D. Mass 2006).
Id. at 116.
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78 F. Supp. 2d 731 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
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Id. at 736–37.
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Id. at 737.
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Shmulevich, supra note 27, at 63–64 (citing Cybersell v. Cybersell, 130 F.3d 414, 419–20 (9th
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140

commercial aspect, taken together, the contacts are likely sufficient to
establish sufficient minimum contacts such that personal jurisdiction would
be proper under Zippo.
3. Calder v. Jones Effects Test
The effects test is premised on the idea that personal jurisdiction is
proper when the jurisdiction is the focal point of where the harm has been
suffered and the defendant purposefully aimed his activities at the forum
state.141 Because the defendant aimed his activities at the forum state, he
can reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.142
In the present case, the plaintiff brought the action in the state where it
is incorporated and headquartered. Because the defendant’s app infringes
on the plaintiff’s ability to profit by using its data without paying the
licensing fee, the harm is felt at the plaintiff’s principal place of business,
and therefore Connecticut is the focal point of the harm suffered.
Most courts agree, however, that it is not enough that the harm of the
defendant’s conduct is felt in the forum state;143 the defendant must have
also purposefully directed his activities at the forum state. In the present
case, it is doubtful that a court would find that the creator of the app
purposefully directed his activities at the forum state. It is unknown
whether the defendant knew that the plaintiff’s principal place of business
was in Connecticut. It is also unknown whether the defendant even knew
that he was stealing the plaintiff’s data because it is possible that he was
taking it from one of the plaintiff’s licensees.
An argument could be made that the geolocation aspect of the app
suggests that the defendant purposefully directed his activities at the forum
state. However, the same issue arises as with purposeful availment in the
Internet context: because the defendant has directed his activities at every
state, does that lessen the fact that the app is also customized for the forum
state?144 For the purposes of the effects test, it likely would. The effects
test examines whether there was purposeful direction to determine whether
litigating in a particular forum would have been foreseeable to the
defendant, and therefore, directing activities at every state through a
geolocation device would unlikely be sufficient to satisfy the purposeful
140
See id. at 76 (“Regardless of how the term interactive is defined, there can be no personal
jurisdiction over [the defendant] because its activity on the web site is not commercial.”).
141
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1983).
142
Id.
143
See supra text accompanying notes 82–83.
144
Kevin F. King does not address this issue. Rather, he addresses the effects test under a
defamation hypothetical and concludes that because the comments are addressed towards a resident of
the forum state, the presence of geolocation technology on a website would be superfluous to the
inquiry. King, supra note 70, at 90–91.
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direction prong.
Without specific evidence that the defendant knew that he would cause
harm to the plaintiff in Connecticut and that he purposefully directed his
actions there, a court would be unlikely to find that the defendant could
have reasonably anticipated being haled into court there. Therefore, the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant would not be proper.
4. Stream of Commerce
The stream of commerce test is meant to assess a defendant’s contacts
with the forum state where the defendant placed a good into the stream of
commerce and the good ended up in the forum state. The issue of apps, as
with the Internet, is similar to the stream of commerce, in that once the app
is created, the creator “may have some idea of where it will end up, but not
total control.”145 In this case, the defendant placed his app into the
electronic stream of commerce. He created the app and then submitted it
to one of the smartphone retailers so that it would be available to
smartphone users through an online store such as Apple’s App Store or
Android’s Marketplace. The user then downloaded the app, bringing it
into the forum state.
Courts have held that personal jurisdiction is proper where the
defendant sells its products through an online retailer.146 However, more
than simply putting the product into the stream of commerce is required
under Justice O’Connor’s “stream of commerce plus” doctrine, which is
the most widely accepted doctrine for evaluating electronic stream of
commerce cases.147 To find sufficient minimum contacts, the defendant
must have purposefully directed its products at the forum state.148 This
requirement makes sense “[b]ecause a web site is accessible at all times to
Internet users in any particular forum, [so] it is reasonable to require
additional conduct. . . . Otherwise, personal jurisdiction over [app] creators
would have no rational limits.”149 The courts are divided regarding exactly
how much more additional conduct is required to find sufficient minimum
contacts. Some courts have concluded that any additional conduct is
sufficient,150 while others have required additional conduct related to the
plaintiff’s claim, such as shipping offending products into the forum state
or entering into “agreements to provide online services to substantial
145

MacDonald, supra note 8, at 548.
Dedvukaj v. Maloney, 447 F. Supp. 2d 813, 822 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
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Stravitz, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, supra note 96, at 932.
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Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1987).
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Stravitz, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, supra note 96, at 939.
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Id. For example, one court found that there was sufficient additional conduct when the
defendant’s website had six subscribers who lived in the forum state. Am. Network, Inc. v. Access
America/Connect Atlanta, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 494, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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numbers of forum state residents.”
In the present case, the defendant has done more than simply create a
website. While the app is in many ways analogous to a website for the
minimum contacts inquiry, the app itself is more: it is downloaded onto the
smartphone and is accessible at any time. It is as if the user has physically
downloaded computer software onto his phone. Furthermore, the app
satisfies the two foregoing examples of how that additional conduct can be
satisfied. The defendant essentially ships the app into the forum state over
the electronic stream of commerce, and when the app is downloaded, the
defendant is agreeing to provide online services (i.e. weather data) to the
user.
Additionally, the use of geolocation technology potentially plays an
important role in the stream of commerce inquiry. The defendant has
purposefully customized the product for use in the forum state. When
looking for purposeful direction, courts frequently look to whether the
defendant has customized the product in some way for the forum, such as a
French company’s labeling of water bottles in ounces rather than metric
measurements so that they can be sold in the American market. 152
Likewise, the defendant’s app would be essentially useless to users in
Connecticut if the app only displayed the weather for California. Because
the defendant purposefully chose to tailor the app to a user’s location, he
could reasonably anticipate being haled into court wherever the app was
accessed.
When the defendant created the app and made it available for
download from one of the various smartphone app stores, the defendant
placed his app into the stream of commerce. By utilizing geolocation
technology and doing more than simply creating a website, the defendant
purposefully directed his activities at the forum state. Therefore, a court
would likely conclude that minimum contacts are satisfied.
151

B. Fair Play and Substantial Justice
If a court holds that the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts
with the forum state, the court must then determine whether exercising
jurisdiction over the defendant would comply with traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice. The court will consider (1) the burden on
the defendant of having to litigate in a foreign state; (2) the forum state’s
interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest
151

Stravitz, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, supra note 96, at 939.
See In re Perrier Bottled Water Litig., 754 F. Supp. 264, 268 (D. Conn. 1990) (holding that the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Perrier was valid under the stream-of-commerce doctrine because
Perrier had designed its product for the U.S. market by labeling the bottles in ounces rather than metric
measurements).
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in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the
shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive
social policies.153
1. The Burden on the Defendant
The burden on the defendant is the most important of the five factors
because it lies at the heart of the fairness inquiry.154 While a plaintiff can
decide not to sue or to sue elsewhere if the burden of trial is too great, a
defendant does not have such an alternative.155 In examining the
defendant’s burden, courts will consider such factors as the distance
between the defendant’s state of residence and the forum state,156 the
defendant’s financial resources (in absolute terms and as compared to the
plaintiff),157 and the defendant’s ability to retain local counsel in the forum
state.158
In the present case, the burden on the defendant is likely to be heavy.
The defendant lives in California and the plaintiff has filed suit in
Connecticut. Courts have given significant weight to the burden on the
defendant in the fairness inquiry when the defendant was faced with a
similar distance between his home state and the forum. 159 Additionally,
there are no mitigating factors to suggest that the distance is not a
significant burden for the defendant. Many apps, including the one in the
fact pattern, are created by a single individual who saw a need or an
interest in a particular kind of app. Because the barriers to entry are quite
low, almost anyone, including teenagers, can create an app. Therefore, the
burden on the defendant will be high if he has to travel to Connecticut to
defend the instant lawsuit. Additionally, the disparity in financial
resources between the plaintiff and the defendant suggest that it would be
153

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
See id. (stating that the burden on the defendant is a primary concern in evaluating the
reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction over the defendant in the forum state).
155
Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1272 (9th Cir. 1981).
156
See Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 210 (1st Cir. 1994) (“[M]ost of the
cases that have been dismissed on grounds of unreasonableness are cases in which the defendant’s
center of gravity, be it place of residence or place of business, was located at an appreciable distance
from the forum.”).
157
See Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002)
(finding that the burden on the defendant of litigating in a foreign jurisdiction was insignificant because
the defendant was a large corporation with substantial financial resources and the plaintiffs had a
combined annual salary of only $37,833).
158
See Am. Greetings Corp. v. Cohn, 839 F.2d 1164, 1170 (6th Cir. 1988) (determining that the
burden on the defendant was not unduly heavy because he was represented by an attorney in the forum
state).
159
See, e.g., Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d at 210 (“The burden associated with forcing a California
resident to appear in a Massachusetts court is onerous in terms of distance. . . . This burden, and its
inevitable concomitant, great inconvenience, are entitled to substantial weight in calibrating the
jurisdictional scales.”).
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unfair to subject the defendant to jurisdiction in Connecticut. The
defendant will be forced to hire local counsel and travel to Connecticut to
defend the suit; such actions may cripple the defendant financially and
impose a significant burden. However, even serious burdens on a
defendant are not dispositive and may be outweighed by other factors.160
2. The Forum State’s Interest
The forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute is one of the most
important of the five factors in the fairness inquiry.161 When considering
the state’s interest, courts consider whether the forum state has “a
legitimate concern with the outcome of the litigation,” most commonly
because of the forum state’s interest in applying its own law or the need to
protect residents of the forum.162 The Supreme Court has articulated that a
state “has a ‘manifest interest’ in providing its residents with a convenient
forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors.”163 However,
it is unclear what factors would make a forum state’s interest stronger or
weaker.
Connecticut has a significant interest in adjudicating the dispute in the
present case. The company has suffered harm by an out-of-state actor, and
Connecticut has an interest in providing the company with a convenient
forum in which to litigate. Additionally, Connecticut has enacted laws
such as the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act164 to protect the public
from unfair practices involving trade or commerce.165 Such actions by the
state legislature suggest that Connecticut has an interest it applying its own
law in the present case. Therefore, Connecticut has a strong interest in
adjudicating the present dispute.
3. The Plaintiff’s Interest
Many courts conclude, with little discussion, that the plaintiff has an
interest in adjudicating his claim in the forum where it was filed.166 After
all, the plaintiff likely selected the forum for a reason. As a result, a
number courts have de-emphasized the importance of this factor, finding
160
See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) (“[W]hen minimum
contacts have been established, often the interests of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of
jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant.”).
161
Abramson, supra note 40, at 451.
162
Id. at 452.
163
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985). When the plaintiff is not a
resident of the forum state, the state’s “legitimate interests in the dispute have considerably
diminished.” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114.
164
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110b (2006).
165
Eder Bros., Inc. v. Wine Merch. of Conn., 275 Conn. 363, 380, 880 A.2d 138, 149 (2005).
166
See Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 624 (9th Cir. 1991) (“No doctorate in astrophysics
is required to deduce that trying a case where one lives is almost always a plaintiff’s preference.”).
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that the plaintiff’s convenience does not significantly influence the fairness
inquiry.167 However, many courts will examine the weight of the
plaintiff’s interest by considering such factors as the plaintiff’s likelihood
of recovery or enforcing a judgment in another forum and the
(in)convenience of litigating elsewhere.168
In the present case, the plaintiff’s likelihood of recovery would
unlikely to be affected if the case were litigated in another forum. While
there may be some, ever so slight advantage to having a “home-town”
jury,169 there is nothing to suggest that litigating in another state would
truly affect the plaintiff’s likelihood of recovery. Courts examining this
factor are generally concerned with the ability of a plaintiff to recover or
enforce a judgment entered in a foreign jurisdiction;170 unless there are
specific reasons that litigating in a particular forum within the United
States would be unfair, any plaintiff’s likelihood of recovery should be
substantially the same across all states. Therefore, this factor does not
suggest that the plaintiff’s interest in litigating in the forum state is
significant.
The inconvenience of litigating in another forum is also not
significantly weighty. It will certainly be easier for the plaintiff to litigate
in the state where the company is incorporated, but courts balance the
plaintiff’s convenience against that of the defendant. When the plaintiff is
a corporate entity, with the resources to litigate in another forum, “the
weight a court accords to the plaintiff’s interest is not as significant.”171
Because the plaintiff in the current case is better equipped to litigate in a
distant forum than is the defendant, a court is unlikely to find that the
plaintiff’s interest in litigating in Connecticut is very strong.
Because the above factors do not suggest that the plaintiff has a
particularly strong interest in litigating its claim in Connecticut, this factor
weighs only slightly in favor of the plaintiff.

167
See, e.g., Caruth v. Int’l Psychoanalytical Ass’n, 59 F.3d 126, 129 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Although
the importance of the forum to the plaintiff nominally remains part of this test, cases have cast doubt on
its significance . . . [the plaintiff’s] convenience does not significantly influence our analysis.”). But cf.
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114 (“When minimum contacts have been established, often the interests of the
plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed on the
alien defendant.”).
168
Abramson, supra note 40, at 456–58.
169
See Queen Uno Ltd. P’ship v. Coeur D’Alene Mines Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1352 (D.
Colo. 1998) (discussing how jurors may be biased in favor of a local company that is a major employer
for the area).
170
See, e.g., Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. U.S. Golf Ass’n, 728 F. Supp. 1429, 1435 (D. Ariz. 1990)
(finding the plaintiff’s interest to be significant where a foreign court would not enforce U.S. antitrust
laws).
171
Abramson, supra note 40, at 457.
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4. The Interstate Judicial System’s Interest
In evaluating this factor, courts seek to determine whether it would be
efficient to litigate the case in the forum state. As one court has stated,
“[k]ey to this inquiry are the location of the witnesses, where the wrong
underlying the lawsuit occurred, what forum’s substantive law governs the
case, and whether jurisdiction is necessary to prevent piecemeal
litigation.”172
Many of the witnesses in the present case are likely located in
Connecticut because the plaintiff will likely call a number of its employees
as witnesses. There will also be witnesses located in California (who could
attest to the defendant’s conduct) and in other areas of the United States
(such as technology experts who can testify to how the defendant acquired
the plaintiff’s weather information). However, Connecticut is likely home
to the greatest number of witnesses.
It is unclear where the wrong underlying the suit occurred. It could be
argued that it occurred in California when the defendant created the app. It
could be argued that the wrong essentially happened in cyberspace and did
not physically occur anywhere. It could be argued that because the harm
was felt in Connecticut, the wrong occurred in Connecticut. However, it is
unclear where a court would conclude the harm occurred.
Because the plaintiff chose to bring the case in Connecticut, the
plaintiff likely chose to invoke Connecticut substantive law. There is
nothing to suggest that the law of any other state would apply to this
dispute.
Finally, the fact pattern does not address whether there will be other
parties joined in the suit. Assuming no other parties are joined, there is not
a concern for piecemeal litigation.
Therefore, Connecticut is almost certainly the most efficient forum in
which to litigate the case, and this factor weighs in favor of exercising
personal jurisdiction over the defendant in Connecticut. However, most
courts accord the interstate judicial system’s interest in the efficient
resolution of controversies less weight than is given to the defendant’s
interest, the plaintiff’s interest, and the forum state’s interest.173
5. The Shared Interest of the Several States
Finally, courts consider the shared interest of the several states in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies. What this means is that
the court must consider the “procedural and substantive policies of other
[states and] nations whose interests are affected by the assertion of
172
173

Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Bartile Roofs, Inc., 618 F.3d 1153, 1163 (10th Cir. 2010).
Abramson, supra note 40, at 460.
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174

jurisdiction by the [forum state].”
In reality, however, few courts give
this factor individualized consideration (or indeed consideration at all)
because they treat it as closely related to the to interstate judicial system’s
interest and the forum state’s interest.175 The exception is when the dispute
is between nations, rather than states, because there may be significant
sovereignty concerns.176
In the present case, the parties are both domestic, so a court is unlikely
to give the shared interests of the several states much consideration. There
likely is a shared interest between the states in providing a forum for
residents (both individual and corporate) when they are harmed. This
shared interest would certainly weigh in favor of exercising personal
jurisdiction over the defendant in Connecticut and, as discussed previously,
Connecticut’s interest is fairly strong. However, because courts are
reluctant to give this factor much, if any, consideration, a court would
likely find that this factor only weighs slightly in favor of exercising
jurisdiction in Connecticut.
6. Weighing the Factors
It is unclear how a court would balance these factors because courts
differ significantly on how much weight they ascribe to each factor. Only
the first factor weighs in favor of the defendant so, all things being equal, it
would appear that the plaintiff and Connecticut should prevail. However,
there is an argument to be made that a court in Connecticut should not
exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. Although four factors favor the
plaintiff and exercising jurisdiction in Connecticut, with the exception of
the forum state’s interest, they do not strongly favor exercising jurisdiction
in Connecticut. Therefore, if the analysis essentially boils down to
balancing the forum state’s interest in protecting its citizens against the
significant burden imposed on the defendant of having to litigate in a
distant state, it seems just that the defendant prevail. Connecticut may
have an interest in protecting its citizens, but we should have faith that its
citizens would also be adequately and fairly protected in the courts of other
states. The defendant, however, may not be able to adequately defend
himself in Connecticut because of the potentially staggering costs of
frequent trips across the United States and obtaining local counsel. If the
crux of the inquiry is meant to be fairness, would it not be more fair to
protect the interests of an individual over the interests of a state?
This argument is not meant to be predictive, but rather it is meant to
174

Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987) (emphasis omitted).
Abramson, supra note 40, at 465.
176
See id. at 465–68 (discussing judicial consideration of the “shared interests” factor with regard
to international and domestic defendants).
175
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show that perhaps this case would be a close call—indeed, many courts
would likely conclude that exercising personal jurisdiction over the
defendant in Connecticut would be fair. However, the low barriers to entry
for creating apps increases the probability that legally unsophisticated
individuals with limited means will be pitted against large corporations. In
such situations, even though minimum contacts may exist, the courts
should thoughtfully consider whether exercising personal jurisdiction over
such an individual would in fact comply with traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.
V. CONCLUSION
Because courts have not evaluated personal jurisdiction doctrine as it
relates to apps, the question raised by apps can only be addressed by
analogizing to issues that the courts have previously addressed. As shown
above, there are a number of ways in which minimum contacts can be
assessed, but which makes the most sense for apps?
The traditional personal jurisdiction analysis remains the best way to
assess whether sufficient minimum contacts are established through a
smartphone app and whether personal jurisdiction is proper. Apps do not
fit squarely into the Internet jurisdiction frameworks because they are
something more than just a website. Additionally, they do not fit well into
stream of commerce or electronic stream-of-commerce because apps are at
once both a good and electronic.
The traditional analysis, on the other hand, has the flexibility to take
into account all of the ways that the defendant, through the app, interacts
with a forum state. As shown in Part IV, much of the analysis is very factsensitive, and that fact-sensitivity is needed when assessing apps because
they are all so different. Not all apps are free. Not all apps utilize
geolocation technology. Not all apps even need to access the Internet after
they have been downloaded. A specialized framework cannot account for
all of these differences, and in fact the Zippo framework has been criticized
for precisely that failure.177 What is needed is a balanced approach that
accounts for the all of the complexities and unique characteristics of apps,
and that can only be accomplished by assessing apps under the traditional
personal jurisdiction analysis.

177
See King, supra note 70, at 83 (stating that some circuits have criticized Zippo for being too
simplistic for regular use).
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